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Passive Protection Against Fire In A Distillation Unit And Atmospheric Vacuum

1. INTRODUCTION

In the context of petrochemical production facilities or oil refineries, potential accidents involving flammable substances can cause irreparable damage to property, including the lives of employees and temporary or permanent impairment of the environmental conditions of the community around the installations.

These are accidents of high-explosive, capable of consuming equipment and industrial installations in a few hours, and represents a potential large-scale imaging.

According to Sperandio (2008, p.6), the temperature rise is the first effect of the heat. Which develops in different speeds for bodies of different materials.

The thermal damage include loss of mechanical strength of piping and equipment due to heat exposure cause the failure of seals, broken lines and oil spills. Besides that, if the power wiring and instrumentation be incapacitated, it is impossible to operate the emergency valves for isolation, vents, openings, water spray systems, automatic or manual, mainly due to damage caused by fire.

Passive protection can provide additional time for other means of fire fighting to control and extinguish the fire and save the plant before the thermal effects cause the impairment of equipment and / or its functions.

Because of convection, a fire can spread to magazines quite a distance from the original focus, but the upper floors of a building through windows, doors or stairwells to enable the spread of vertical column of heated gases (SPERANDIO, 1994, p.B04).

This and other effects are sufficient to support the previous requirement of insurers in the installation of fireproofing systems in petrochemical plants, including passive protection is one of the requirements provided for the benefit inherent in the early stages of a start a fire.

So, besides being a safety requirement, is also a contractual requirement which covers the interests of key stakeholders in the insurance policy processes.

1.1 OBJECTIVES

This paper aims to address the general case study of the implementation of passive protection against fire in a selected area within the atmospheric distillation unit and vacuum a Brazilian company active in the Oil and Gas

From the overall objective, this paper has the following objectives:

a) test the hypothesis of occurrence of fire scenarios "Jet Fire" and "fire in pool" in the area selected for the case study;

b) measure (s) degree (s) risk priority (GPR);

c) depending on the significance of the prioritization of risk (GPR) to determine (s) their (s) action (s) recommended (s);

d) according to the recommended action, submit their action taken to effect the implementation of passive protection against fire-oriented equipment and facilities located within the area selected for the case study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Firestopping or "fire protection" has to be a systematic process, including the use of materials that provides a degree of fire resistance to protect the structures. This protection can be active or passive (AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, 1999).

Among the various types of passive protection in the market may be cited: the barriers of fire protection, fire-resistant construction, proper spacing, safe separation distance, drainage and insulation.

Finally, means of coating, barrier or safeguard that provides protection against the heat of fire without any additional intervention (AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE op.cit.).

However, the main goal of passive protection is achieved already during the early stages of the fire, while efforts are directed to stop the units and process equipment, insulation oil flow from the fire, drive systems for active combat and water currents cooling.

According to API 2218 (AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, 1999), determining the need for fire protection and fireproofing is determined through the lessons learned involving previous experiences and / or analysis of the "fire scenarios". From the analysis of a "fire scenario" is developed so-called "envelope of fire", which consists of a three-dimensional space in which the equipment stops leaking fluid or flammable fuel capable of burning time and with sufficient intensity to cause damage property.

2.1 FIRE SCENARIOS

Both the standard American Petroleum Institute op.cit., And Silveira (2005), distinguish two main junctures in which there would be exposure to direct flame or by heat fluxes arising from fire: fire stream (jet fire) and fire in pool (pool fire).

As the definitions of the standard American Petroleum Institute op.cit., Jet fire is a leak in a pressurized system which ignita and forms a jet of fire that can focus on other equipment. The length of the jet can reach up to 150 times the diameter of the orifice of the jet. Results of tests show exposure to the jet stream at speeds of incidence of about 130 ft / s, the flame temperatures of 1093 C (2000 ° F) and heat flux of 100,000 BTU / ft ²-h (320 kW / m²).

The same rule sets fire in the pool as a pool ignition caused by fuel leaks, which can burn with a flame height of two to three times the diameter of the pool. Historically values are used for the burning rate of pool fires in 6 to 12 in / h for gasoline and 5 to 8 in / h for kerosene, in relation to its depth.

In this case study has been that the products resulting from the atmospheric distillation unit are kerosene, light diesel, heavy diesel and naphtha. While the products of distillation, vacuum gas oil is light, heavy and vacuum residue. All, therefore, are highly flammable substances (ABADIE, 2002, p.19).

In this context, it is important to note that passive protection can serve as a protective barrier, allowing the escape of personnel operating in the area. Since the human body tolerates only 15 seconds to radiant heat up to 2500 BTU / ft ²-hr (8 kW / m²), any preventive measures implemented can be the difference between life and death in the context of an accident involving the combustion of hydrocarbons ( AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, 1999).

3. METHODOLOGY

The research method was applied through the assessment instrument used on the data collected, for which he was chosen among the FMEA analysis methodologies known risk: Preliminary Hazard / Risk (APP / APR), Vulnerability Analysis, HAZID, HAZOP, among others (Moraes, 2009, p.1251-1252).

3.1 research design

This case study is aimed at an area with a history of accidents within the flammable Unit Process atmospheric and vacuum distillation of a Brazilian refinery Sector Oil and Gas

The work was restricted to a circular area containing three (3) pumps, process piping, two (2) members of structural steel columns and two (2) sections of the cabling raceways containing power and control (instrumentation).

The focus of the research was focused on the implementation of passive protection against fire in the foregoing elements, in particular referred to:

· Code area, which is essential to interpret the gas / flammable vapor, to be released out, tends to rise or fall. As this could help define the location of the area at risk levels higher or lower depending on the relative density of the flammable mixture (Franco et al., 2002, p.17);

· Fire scenarios, as discussed earlier;

· Material selection of passive protection.

3.2 LIST OF ASSUMPTIONS

In this case study were raised two (2) assumptions related to the most likely scenarios of fire, according to the historical data of accidents in the chosen area:

1st accident hypothesis: the possibility of occurrence of the effect of jet fire;

2nd accident hypothesis: the possibility of occurrence of fire in effect pool.

The case study tested both hypotheses, presenting conclusions.

3.3 DATA COLLECTION

In order to accomplish the data collection interviews were held with professionals involved in the production process and support the Unit Process atmospheric and vacuum distillation to meet the deployment requirements of the systems adopted for fire protection (fireproofing) and the context associated .

The collected data were entered into the FMEA to cause / effect relationship and facilitate the feedback process of the interviewees, but being careful not to make their active participation in this research.

Data collected: documents such as meeting minutes, memorials calculation, drawings, sketches, interviews and additional procedures carried out from 28/09/09 to 29/10/09 with the staff with access to data and information holdings.

a) Location Data:

· Map of risk: high risk due to the presence of flammable substances;

· Equipment: pumps identified by "B1", "B2" and "B3", which operate the exhaust combustion products such as kerosene, diesel oil and naphtha.

As · API RP 505 (AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, 1997) and NFPA 70 (NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, 2008), the classification of the area correspond to Zone 2 (open or ventilation). But the area already has a history of accidents;

· Connections: process piping, contain flammable mixture pumped into food processing units adjacent to the selected area;

Electrical ducts ·: identified two (2) conduits containing wiring responsible for food control and instrumentation installation site and the neighbors, since through the entire industry;

· Structural elements: two (2) columns that support the roof, which have shaped profile of "I" and are identified by "C1" and "C2".

4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Depending on risk analysis (FMEA) used with the criteria mentioned above (scenarios of fire, area classification and envelope of fire), were recommended actions for each element analyzed.

4.1 PROCESS PUMPS

Within the specified area, the failure modes related to 3 process pumps, are:

a) Parade (s) pump (s), with severity equal to 9 (nine);

b) Leakage of flammable fluid, with severity equal to 10 (ten).

Why not present a risk priority (GPR) of concern, the first failure mode has not received specific actions outside those already listed in the FMEA: scheduled maintenance and eventual activation of safety valves.

For the second failure mode, the following actions were recommended:

a) Replacing the seal kit and pump;

b) Installation of fire protection at the base (s) pump (s).

Importantly the GPR achieved for this mode of failure, 450. It is the second highest risk potential found in the FMEA.

This fact can not be ignored and justifies the resulting actions taken to mitigate and / or eliminate the risk:

· Trade sealing kits were provided to manufacturers of pumps and equipment foundations were rebuilt according to the internal rules of design and installation of passive protection.

That is, the concrete bases were reconstructed in order to include the specifications of the envelope of fire.

4.2 PIPING AND RELATED LINKS

The tubing and connections located within the area evaluated several transport fluids containing (or not) flammable substances.

The potential failure mode "leakage of vapor and gas product" pointed severity equal to 10 (ten). Who is the greatest concern, since it represents the greatest security risk.

It was found through its effects, that the failure mode is associated with the jet of fire and fire in puddle. Being caused by a leakage or cracks in the pipe.

The recommended action related to the criterion of severity / occurrence (S / O) of greater severity, was the installation of passive protection against fire facing the circular profiles in the connections / section of pipe classified as zone 2 within the range of potential fire envelope .

As a result of actions taken, the material passive protection were the mastic and blankets to protect the pipes and fittings attached.

4.3 raceways wired CONTROL AND STRENGTH

Regarding the wiring in raceways containing power and control instrumentation crossing a section of the study area, the potential failure modes are more serious than those raised in the previous analysis.

All failure modes have equal severity to 9 (nine), a classification that indicates risk of compromising security.

In this classification, lists the following failure modes:

a) interruption of energy flow and control;

b) failure (partial or total) of the physical integrity of power cables and control.

Both also have the highest S / O equal to 9 (nine), which justifies the recommended actions to mitigate or eliminate the risks that threaten security.

Recommended actions to prevent the occurrence of failure modes are:

a) Transfer to wire power and control to the ground, ie, burying some sections of the line of cabling;

b) Implement the passive protective coatings, applying intumescent paint exposed cables and conduits using materials designed for spray and blankets refractory.

Important to note that the failure of the physical integrity of the cables showed the highest GPR, equal to 729, which effectively makes their recommended actions the highest priority among all of the implementation of passive protection against fire.

4.4 SUPPORT STRUCTURES

Within the specified area are contained in 2 (two) columns that support the upper floor, which contains other facilities and equipment. They are structural elements of steel with shaped profile of "I".

The three potential failure modes found indicated severity equal to 10 (ten), that is the most serious identified as a result of one of the failure modes listed below. Are:

a) failure of the mechanical strength of the steel support columns;

b) Heating of the upper structure supported by the structural element column;

c) Collapse of the supporting structure.

All three had a S / O high, having been recommended the following action to prevent the occurrence of failure modes:

· Deploy passive protection through plasterboard or concrete as indicated in the theoretical framework for the structures with a profile of "I".

5. Conclusions

In evaluating the bombs, it was important to note that the second failure mode is associated with the effects of fire and jet fire in pool. This finding supports the hypothesis of occurrence of these two events as true, as the proposal made in the survey of hypotheses.

In evaluating the pipes and their connections, the failure mode "leak vapors and gases of the product" is also associated with the effects of fire and jet fire in pool. This finding also supports the hypothesis of occurrence of these two events as true.

In the evaluation of the raceways and cabling under control, although no association with the above effects is no effect of high damage as:

a) start a fire within the ducting;

b) threat of failure of automatic activation (assets) of fire fighting and detection (alarm);

c) failure of equipment to the neighboring area;

d) stopping the production process of the unit.

The first two are so potentially dangerous as the manifestation of jet fire and fire in pool.

Although of lower intensity, may take longer to achieve equivalent damage in the area.

Since the evaluation of the support columns point out the risks of high intensity, comparable to the effects of jet fire and pool fire on, but events are difficult to occur because of existing controls allow a wide level of detection.

5.1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CASE STUDY

As Palady (1997, p.45-46) says, we must continually review the FMEA throughout the life of the process or system. This usually occurs so successful in the simultaneous implementation of a process or system, but may fail when improvements are made in one part without considering the revision of the process (or system) as a whole.

For example, the FMEAs delivered by manufacturers of equipment and facilities as a condition for obtaining customer acceptance at the time of deployment of equipment in the area.

However, it is possible that the customer has not reviewed the entire process or system in which that new equipment is being integrated. Simply replace the documentation of the old equipment by new and stays with the old documentation of the process (or system) without changes.

This is the most plausible explanation to explain why the results found in this case study were not evaluated before. What makes it interesting to carry out an extension of this research in other areas, even through another methodology of risk analysis.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the mistake represented by outdated data can compromise the validity of any risk analysis carried out and make their results inconsistent. Creating a dangerous precedent for the occurrence of accidents or incidents since the reliability of the database can become questionable by not adequately measure the degree of risk priority ones.

5.2 Conclusions of the work

The proposed objectives were achieved the overall objective and specific.

Objective was generally dealt with the case study of the implementation of passive protection against fire in a selected area within an atmospheric distillation unit and vacuum a company in the sector of Oil and Gas

Specific Objectives:

a) Both the hypothesis 1 (jet fire) and the hypothesis 2 (fire in pool) proved to be true, that is, these fire scenarios may in fact happen in the study area;

b) The degree of risk priority (GPR) were measured and listed below:

· Function "pumping the product through the pipe line" (process pumps "B1", "B2" and "B3"), GPR equal to 45;

· Function "Keep constant pressure in the pipe line" (process pumps "B1", "B2" and "B3"), GPR equal to 450;

· Function "Driving the flow of product to the process equipment (pipes and connections related), GPR equal to 150;

· Function "Drive power cables and control equipment inside and outside the processing unit (electrocuted), GPR equal to 729;

· Function "Support of higher dimensions of the columns in the study area (structural elements" C1 "and" C2 "), GPR equal to 80;

c) For the priority levels of risk relevant GPR less than 80, were recommended appropriate actions to mitigate its GPR. Recommended actions were:

· GPR equal to 450, "exchange of kit for sealing pumps" and "passive protection (base of the pumps). New GPR equal to 72;

· GPR equal to 150, "passive protection (profiles cylindrical). New GPR equal to 50;

· GPR equal to 729, "passive protection of the raceways and cabling. New GPR equal to 45;

· GPR at 80, "passive protection in the envelopes of fire." New GPR equal to 50;

d) Implementation of measures of passive protection against fire to their corresponding recommended actions. The actions taken were:

• For recommended actions "exchange of kit for sealing pumps" and "passive protection (base pumps)" are being implemented actions "trade in progress with manufacturers" and "reconstruction of the base of the pumps as specified by the envelope of fire ";

Stops the action recommended "passive protection (profiles cylindrical)" was implemented action "selected materials: mastic, others designed for spray and blankets refractory";

Stops the action recommended "passive protection of the raceways and cabling has been deployed to action" selected materials: refractory blankets, and other intumescent paint applied by spray;

Stops the action recommended "passive protection in the envelopes of fire" was implemented action "selected materials: refractory layer and plasterboard.

As a final consideration, this work has achieved the purpose of enhancing and highlighting the passive protection as prevention and effective fire fighting.

Future studies are welcome, because there is little research directed to issue passive protection against fire. It is suggested that the issue be investigated under the different focuses of the various disciplines of engineering and management.

REFERENCES

ABADIE, Elie. Refining Processes: book the training course for operators of the refinery. Curitiba: UnicenP, 2002. 76p.

American Petroleum Institute. API 2218: Fireproofing Practices In Petrolum and Petrochemical Processing Plants. USA, 01/08/1999.

______________API RP 505: Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, and Zone 2. USA, 01/11/1997.

Franco, Luciano Rubim; JORDAN, Dácio de Miranda; KAZMIERSKI, Andre Luis da Silva.Prevenção explosion and other risks: book the training course for operators of the refinery. Curitiba: UnicenP, 2002. 42p.

MORAES, Giovanni. Commented Regulatory Standards: Volume 3. 7th edition. RJ: GVC, 2009. 1918p.

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION. NFPA 70: National Electrical Code (NEC) Handbook. USA, 2008 Edition.

PALADY, Paul. FMEA: Analysis of Failure Modes and Effects - anticipating and preventing problems before they occur. SP: Imam, 1997. 270p.

Silveira, Cintia. Passive Protection of Structures and Electrical Systems Fire applied to a unit of Oil Refining. 2005. 113 f. Dissertation - UFRGS: Post-Graduation in Mechanical Engineering (PROMEC), Porto Alegre, 2005. Available at: . Accessed 2 ago. 2009, 23:23.

SPERANDIO, Carlos Augusto. Fundamentals of Safety Engineering Work. 1st Edition. Curitiba: CEFET-PR, ago. 1994. 164p.

______________Proteção Fire and Explosion: Master Course of Specialization in Engineering Work Safety. Curitiba: UTFPR, 2008. 163p.

About the Author

António Nogueira is a Civil Engineer and expert in Concrete. Visit Projetos de Engenharia, see the calculo estrutural and concreto armado

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